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Abstract: Russia’s annexation of Crimea and ongoing efforts to
de-stabilize Eastern Ukraine have led NATO and the US to adopt
a number of initiatives aimed at “reassuring” Eastern and Central
European allies. This article assesses the implications of those initiatives for NATO’s evolving position in Eastern Europe. It also appraises the Alliance’s renewed focus on defense and deterrence with
respect to European and transatlantic capabilities.

T

he aim of this article is to assess NATO’s evolving geostrategic
position in Eastern Europe in the context of a resurgent Russia.1
Admittedly, the military-strategic level is but one aspect of Russia’s
resurgence. Although Russian military power did play an important part
in the annexation of Crimea and subsequent de-stabilization of Eastern
Ukraine, Moscow is showing a clear preference for “non-traditional”
ways and means when it comes to expanding its influence across Eastern
Europe, including energy blackmail, the use of undercover assets (the
so-called “little green men”), financial penetration, cyber-attacks, and
information warfare. This is particularly true in the case of Eastern
and Central European countries covered by NATO’s mutual defense
guarantee. In this regard, economic and political means are likely to
become central to any Western response or strategy aimed at countering Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Having said this, Central and
Eastern European perceptions of Russian power are largely mediated by
the evolving military-strategic balance. Thus, the latter provides a sort of
“superstructure” or framework within which geopolitical competition in
Eastern Europe plays out.
This article looks at Europe’s “Eastern Flank” primarily from a
geostrategic perspective. The opening section examines some of the
main initiatives adopted by NATO’s Heads of State and Government
at the September 2014 Summit in Wales, and assesses their contribution to defense and deterrence in Eastern Europe. The second section
seeks to place these initiatives within a broader geostrategic context, by
breaking down the so-called eastern flank into three sub-components
or sub-theaters: the Baltic Sea; the Black Sea; and the “continental”
northeastern European flank. It identifies the main geostrategic vulnerabilities NATO faces in each sub-theater and suggests possible ways to
overcome them. The third and final section looks at the implications

1     The author would like to thank Alexander Mattelaer, James Rogers, and Daniel Fiott for their
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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of NATO’s renewed emphasis on defense and deterrence for European
and transatlantic discussions on capability development, and offers
some broader reflections on what the crisis of the “crisis management”
paradigm might mean for Western military strategy.

NATO Reloaded? The 2014 Wales Summit

Arguably, the main outcome from the 2014 Wales summit was the
return of defense and deterrence in Eastern Europe to the center of
NATO debates.2 This does not mean the era of Western expeditionary
military operations has come to pass. However, Russia’s annexation of
Crimea in February 2014 and subsequent meddling in Eastern Ukraine
has aggravated a sense of insecurity amongst NATO’s Central and
Eastern European allies, and prompted the Alliance to place a renewed
emphasis on defense and deterrence in an Eastern Flank context. A
clear illustration of this fact was NATO’s decision in Wales to adopt the
Readiness Action Plan, to ensure the Alliance will be able to react to
crises swiftly and firmly.
The backbone of the Readiness Action Plan will be a new Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force of some 4,000-6,000 troops, which should
be able to deploy to the front line within a matter of days.3 Credibility
will hinge on the existence of appropriate reception facilities, logistics
and equipment in each of the allied countries situated on the Eastern
European “front-line.” It will also require the construction of bases and
fuel and ammunition depots that can be used on short notice. More
particularly, streamlining the Alliance’s command and control infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe will be key to the success of the
Readiness Action Plan. Hence NATO’s recent efforts to strengthen the
role of Multinational Corps Northeast (Szczecin, Poland) in the planning, command, and control of Eastern European-related contingencies
and in ensuring high readiness.
Pessimists might be tempted to portray the Readiness Action Plan
and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force as yet another “made-inBrussels” political compromise that comes short of satisfying ongoing
demands for a permanent presence of NATO troops in Central and
Eastern Europe – and ultimately fails to provide a credible conventional deterrent against Russian military power. The fact that NATO’s
Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) will not have full authority to
call allied troops into the front-line – as some member states hoped he
might – is arguably the greatest shortcoming of the Readiness Action
Plan. However, the Alliance’s insistence on “all year-round” rotations
promises to give the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force a status just
short of a permanent presence in Central and Eastern Europe.4
The rotations foreseen in a Readiness Action Plan/Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force context will complement similar initiatives undertaken by individual allies. Most notably, the United States
announced in late April 2014 the redeployment of 600 paratroopers
from its 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (based in Vicenza) to
2      James Bergeron, “Back to the Future in Wales,” RUSI Journal 159, No. 3 (June-July 2014): 4-8.
3      “Wales Summit Declaration,” issued on September 5, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
4      Author’s interview with NATO official in Brussels, September 22, 2014.
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Poland and the Baltic States.5 These troops will be conducting training
and exercises with the armed forces of Poland and the Baltic States and
will remain in those countries “until further notice.”6 In addition, the
US Air Force has decided to increase the number and size of F-16 rotations into its Aviation Detachment at Lask Air Base (Poland), as part of
its post-Crimea effort to reassure Central and Eastern European allies.7
All in all, the all-year-round nature of Readiness Action Plan/Very
High Readiness Joint Task Force and US force rotations could constitute
an allied tripwire of sorts in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it
remains to be seen how long these rotations will be maintained, for
now they seem to have given the allies a de facto permanence in the area.
Moreover, it is important to situate the Readiness Action Plan/Very
High Readiness Joint Task Force and US initiatives within the framework of a broader trend, namely the increasing presence and visibility of
NATO in Central and Eastern Europe following Russia’s annexation of
Crimea in February 2014. This trend has presided over a higher-tempo
of NATO air patrols over the Baltic States, of naval patrols in the Baltic
and Black Seas and more frequent and large-scale military exercises in
Central and Eastern Europe.8
Admittedly, the United States has been the main driving political
force behind many of the NATO initiatives aimed at reassuring the
Central and Eastern European allies in a post-Crimea context. However,
there have not been any major adjustments to US force posture in
Europe. Although the Pentagon is currently conducting a review of US
force posture and defense strategy in Europe, a significant reintroduction of US military assets to the European theater seems unlikely, not
least as sequestration continues to impose budgetary constraints on the
Pentagon.9 The ongoing demand for US military engagement in the
Middle East and Washington’s intention to rebalance its strategic efforts
in favor of the Asia-Pacific constitute additional obstacles to a significant reintroduction of US military assets into the European theater of
operations.
In Washington’s eyes, Russia’s geopolitical resurgence in Eastern
Europe represents just one of many global security challenges.10 This
may partly explain why the United States is adopting an increasingly
indirect approach to European security, by placing partnerships up
front and stepping up its calls to European allies to do more to uphold
Europe’s security order.11 Indeed, if NATO’s commitment to strengthen
the security of the eastern flank is to be meaningful, it is imperative
Europeans take defense more seriously. The pledge adopted by NATO’s
Heads of State and Government to halt any further decline in defense
5      “Vincenza-based Paratroops Deploying to Poland, Baltics,” Stars and Stripes, April 22, 2014.
6      Author’s interview with NATO official in Brussels, 12 June 2014.
7      Ibid
8      Luis Simón, “‘Back to Basics’ and ‘Out of Area’: Towards a Multi-purpose NATO,” RUSI
Journal 159, No. 3 (June-July 2014): 14-19
9      Multiple interviews with US and NATO officials in Washington and Brussels, June-September
2014. On the impact of sequestration upon the US military see Michael J. Meese, “Strategy and Force
Planning in a Time of Austerity,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 8, No. 3 (Fall 2014), 19-29.
10      Michael G. Roskin, “The New Cold War,” Parameters 44, No. 1 (Spring 2014): 5-9.
11      Sean Kay, “Rebalancing and the Role of Allies and Partners: Europea, NATO and the
Future of American Landpower,” in John Deni (ed.), Augmenting Our Influence: Alliance Revitalization
and Partner Development (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press,
2014): 69-115.
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spending, move towards the Alliance’s 2 percent benchmark within a
decade, and devote greater resources to equipment acquisition, research
and development is a step in the right direction.12
While it remains unclear whether (most) NATO member states will
abide by the promises undertaken at Wales, such promises must not be
regarded in isolation. Since the annexation of Crimea, the European
allies have devoted increasing resources to the Baltic Air Police Mission,
to NATO naval task forces in the Baltic and the Black Sea, and to largescale exercises and training initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe.
Additionally, the new NATO Framework Nations Concept bears a
strong European flavor.13 By encouraging the formation of small groups
of allies coordinated by a lead nation, the aim behind the Framework
Nations Concept is to stimulate the joint development of forces and
capabilities.14 Of the various groupings developing in the framework of
this initiative, two of them are particularly relevant to Europe’s commitment to defense and deterrence in the eastern flank — the German-led
and British-led initiatives.
A German-led, 10-nation strong grouping shall concentrate in logistics support; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection;
delivering fire-power from land, air, and sea; and deployable headquarters. Delivering fire-power from land, air, and sea is surely critical in
an eastern flank context, as is the emphasis on logistical support and
deployable headquarters, which dovetails with the Readiness Action
Plan. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind Germany has doubled
its presence in NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast headquarters
in Szczecin (Poland) from 60 to 120 staff officers.15 This should help
NATO’s plans to move that HQ – predominantly dedicated to territorial
defense – from low to high readiness.
Additionally, a British-led, 7-nation Joint Expeditionary Force will
be able to deploy rapidly into theatre and conduct full spectrum of
operations, including high intensity.16 Although the Joint Expeditionary
Force is not assigned to any particular geographical theatre, its composition hints at a strong Baltic flavor. Indeed, by fostering interoperability
between the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and
the three Baltic States, the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force will
help improve the Alliance’s readiness and ability to project maritime
and amphibious power through the North and Baltic Seas all the way to
the Baltic States. This will represent an important contribution to the
security of NATO’s eastern flank.

Conceptualizing the “Eastern Flank”

As mentioned, the different initiatives adopted by NATO should
be considered in terms of three military-strategic sub-theaters: the
Baltic Sea; the Black Sea; and the continental flank. The Arctic area
could be regarded as a fourth sub-theater of the eastern flank, as it will
12      “Wales Summit Declaration” (note 2).
13      Author’s interview with NATO official in Brussels, June 12, 2014.
14      “Wales Summit Declaration” (note 2).
15      Jan Techau, “Germany’s Budding Defense Debate,” Carnegie Europe, June 17, 2014.
16      “Wales Summit Declaration” (note 2).
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likely become increasingly important geopolitically, and presents a great
degree of interconnectivity with the Baltic Sea.17
Currently, the continental flank is primarily confined to northeastern Europe, and NATO’s efforts to strengthen defense and deterrence
in Eastern Europe focus mainly on the Baltic States and Poland. This
focus is because Ukraine constitutes a large continental buffer separating
Russia from Central Europe (Slovakia, Hungary and southern Poland),
and both Ukraine and Moldova “shield” the entire Balkan Peninsula
from Russia. Should Kiev fall completely within Moscow’s strategic
orbit, the defense of Europe’s eastern flank would become much more
complicated, since the entire continental space running from the Baltic
Sea to the Black Sea – the so-called intermarium – would suddenly be
in play. This possibility means avoiding a full military-strategic alignment between Russia and Ukraine, or Russia and Moldova (whatever the
political modalities), should be a top priority for the West.
In some ways, Belarus’ status as a geopolitical buffer between NATO
and Russia resembles that of Ukraine. Although Minsk is politically close
to Moscow, it still maintains an important degree of military autonomy
in the sense Russian armed forces do not have a significant presence
in Belarusian territory; nor are they in a position to transit Belarusian
territory or airspace freely.18 However, Russia has in recent months
taken steps aimed at reinforcing defense cooperation with Belarus and
expanding its military presence in that country.19 As explained below,
this trend is likely to aggravate Poland’s geostrategic exposure to Russia
and complicate the defense of NATO’s eastern flank.
Admittedly, the Baltic Sea and the northeastern European flank
are very much intertwined. However, its geostrategic supremacy in the
Baltic Sea gives NATO two separate military supply lines to the “frontline” in the Baltic States: a maritime and “amphibious” communication
line running through the North Atlantic and North Sea through the
Baltic Sea; and a continental one running through Germany and Poland
onto the Baltic States. In this regard, the British-led and German-led
Framework Nations groupings shall help further substantiate the “maritime-amphibious” and “continental” foundations of Eastern European
security.

Safeguarding NATO’s Supremacy in the Baltic Sea

During the Cold War period, the Baltic Sea was a highly contested
space, and constituted one of the main geostrategic “battlegrounds”
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the integration of
Poland and the Baltic States in NATO and the EU (and that of Sweden
and Finland in the EU) has given the West a position of political-strategic supremacy in the Baltic to this day. In this regard, initiatives such as
the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, the reinforcement of NATO’s
Baltic Air Policing Mission and Standing Maritime Groups, and a more

17      On the geopolitical interconnectivity between the Baltic and Arctic spaces see James Rogers,
“Geopolitics and the Wider North,” RUSI Journal 157, No. 6 (December 2012): 42-53.
18      Jacek Bartosiak and Tomasz Szatkowski, “Geography of the Baltic Sea: a Military Perspective,”
National Center for Strategic Studies (December 2013, Warsaw).
19     Arkady Moshes, “Belarus’ Renewed Subordination to Russia: Unconditional Surrender or
Hard Bargain?,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 329 (August 2014).
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ambitious program of exercises and training exercises in the area shall
help cement the Alliance’s position in the Baltic.
If NATO is to preserve its strategic supremacy in the Baltic Sea it
must continue to strengthen military-to-military relations with Sweden
and Finland, and seek to integrate those two countries further into its
exercises and defense plans for the Baltic theater of operations. Sweden
would add much value to the Alliance in the Baltic. Its territory envelops large swathes of the Baltic Sea, and the central location of Gotland
makes that island of great geostrategic importance for the defense of
the Baltic States.20 Additionally, greater interoperability with Finland in
the maritime and air domains and a strengthening of the naval, air and
missile defense presence in Estonia would help the Alliance strengthen
its ability to contain the Russian Navy in the Gulf of Finland in the
event of hostilities, and thus complicate Moscow’s access and freedom
of movement in the broader Baltic.
The role of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in underpinning NATO’s
geostrategic supremacy in the Baltic Sea can not be overstated. If the
security of the Baltic States were undermined, Russia’s standing in the
Arctic would be significantly enhanced. In turn, the Alliance’s, own
geostrategic position in the Baltic Sea could rapidly crumble, like a house
of cards, and the Baltic would become again a contested geopolitical
space. Against such a backdrop, Finland and Sweden (who have been
getting closer to NATO recently) might be compelled to “swing back”
into a quasi-neutral status. Hardening the defenses of the Baltic States
and firming up NATO’s presence there is, therefore, a geostrategic
imperative for the Alliance. If the Baltics remain secure and firmly
integrated within the West, then Sweden, Finland, and NATO’s position in the Baltic Sea will also remain secure. Not least, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania straddle the Baltic Sea and the continental, northeastern
European flank, and highlight the high-degree of interdependence
between those two sub-theaters.

The Baltic States and Poland: NATO’s Bulwark in Northeastern Europe

Europe’s northeastern continental flank presents important geostrategic vulnerabilities. Chiefly, the Baltic States are highly exposed
to conventional Russian land and air power. Russia could theoretically
move easily into Estonia by land, air or sea, and into Latvia by land and
air. In turn, the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad borders Lithuania and
could serve to encircle the Baltic States geostrategically. The increasing military-strategic alignment between Moscow and Minsk should
lead Polish and Baltic military planners to assume a high degree of
Belarusian compliance with Russian demands for operational access in
the event of a military conflict in northeastern Europe. This process
threatens to leave Poland directly exposed to Russian military power
and the Baltic States almost completely encircled by Russia and Russian
proxies. Accordingly, the geopolitical evolution of Belarus has a great
incidence upon the security of the Baltic States and Poland – an indeed
upon that of Europe’s northeastern flank.

20      Robert Nurick and Magnus Nordenman (eds.), “Nordic-Baltic Security in the 21st Century:
The Regional Agenda and the Global Role,”Atlantic Council (September 2011).
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The defenses of Europe’s northeastern continental flank will surely
benefit from initiatives such as NATO’s new Readiness Action Plan/
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, the US decision to rotate small
contingents of land forces into Poland and the Baltics, the Germanled Framework Nation grouping, the strengthening of the Alliance’s
command and control presence in Poland or that country’s commitment
to increase defense spending. These are steps in the right direction. The
effective implementation of the Readiness Action Plan and the role of
the German-led Framework Nation grouping will be of paramount
importance, particularly when it comes to testing and improving the
connectivity between Germany, Poland, and the Baltic States in an “AirLand” context. This is, after all, the military-strategic heart of NATO’s
eastern flank.
However, the rotational, non-permanent nature of the Readiness
Action Plan/Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and similar US
initiatives could be insufficient to guarantee the defense of the Baltic
States, which is complicated by the geography of northeastern Europe
and the lack of a conventional military balance against Russian power.
Unless these rotational forward deployments are reinforced by a credible Alliance strategy to deploy overwhelming air power quickly and
follow-on land forces in the area, they will fail to constitute a reliable
conventional deterrent against Russia in northeastern Europe in the
short and medium term. NATO defense planners are already aware of
this shortcoming, and are trying to identify ways of complementing
and reinforcing the measures adopted in Wales.21 However, a credible
conventional follow-up would require a more radical transformation of
allied strategy.
After decades of defense budgetary reductions and an emphasis
on expeditionary warfare, the forces of most European countries have
been hollowed out to such an extent they are unable to field corps or
even divisions in some cases. This leads to the core of the problem: the
existence of a dangerous gap in the Alliance’s strategy for the defense
of the eastern flank, between (part-time?) tripwires of sorts (i.e. the
Readiness Action Plan/Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and US
rotational deployments in the Baltics and Poland) and the promise of
nuclear deterrence. To fill that critical gap, NATO and its Member States
will need to think beyond readiness and devote considerable time and
resources to rebuilding corps and division capabilities.
If NATO is to strengthen the conventional defenses and deterrence of the eastern flank the allies will need to boost their air and
land presence in the Baltic States and Poland, and give such presence
a more permanent form. An Alliance-wide effort to strengthen the
theater missile defenses and air-defenses of the Baltic States and Poland
would also be beneficial. However, any credible defense and deterrence
strategy in the eastern flank would require a greater conventional effort
and commitment on the part of the Western European allies. Greater
military-strategic synergies between Germany and Poland would prove
particularly valuable.
Given the ongoing presence of US and UK military forces in
Germany and the position of Poland and Germany in Central Europe,
21      Author’s interview with NATO defense official in Brussels, September 22, 2014.
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these two countries constitute the geopolitical anchor between Western
and Eastern Europe. In this regard, Germany’s decisions to augment
its command presence in Poland and lead a Framework Nation grouping are steps in the right direction, and should be complemented with
greater efforts to improve the interoperability between the German and
Polish armies and air forces. These measures would ensure that, in the
case of a crisis, NATO would be able to draw on Western reinforcements
rapidly to boost its position in Poland and the Baltic States.
The point is often made that conventional military power will not
be of much help for NATO in the eastern flank, because Russia is using
unconventional warfare techniques, such as cyber-attacks, under-cover
assets (“little green men”), energy blackmail, financial penetration, agitation of ethnic Russian minorities, information warfare and so on.22
This is an important point. In fact, the Alliance has already recognized
it must strengthen the cyber-defenses, information warfare, counterpropaganda and intelligence capabilities of the Baltic States.23 These
are areas that transcend the military proper, and where greater cooperation between NATO and the EU would bring added value. An effort is
also needed to help the Baltic States monitor foreign direct investment
inflows from Russia, as well as to craft strategies to mitigate their energy
dependence.
However, if there is a common thread to Russia’s different
unconventional warfare techniques it is its attempt to undermine the
self-confidence and political morale of target countries. This possibility
is precisely why a conventional military component in the Baltic States
(and Poland) is important: it helps reassure those countries both militarily and, most importantly, politically. By conveying a strong message of
strategic and political support from the West, a permanent conventional
NATO footprint in the Baltics (and Poland) would complement existing rotational deployments and exercises and help further underpin the
confidence of Baltic politicians, businessmen, and opinion formers, and
empower them to turn away from (subtle) Russian means of penetration
when targeted.

The Black Sea Balance after Russia’s Annexation of Crimea

While Russia’s annexation of Crimea and meddling in Eastern
Ukraine may not have directly altered the military-strategic balance in
northeastern Europe or the Baltic Sea, it could constitute a true game
changer in the Black Sea.24 Admittedly, Moscow’s attempts to shore up
its geopolitical standing in the Black Sea area pre-date the annexation
of Crimea. Its 2008 invasion of Georgia and subsequent support to the
breakaway regions of Abkhazia (situated on the Black Sea Basin) and
South Ossetia are most illustrative in this regard. Insofar as Crimea
is concerned, back in 2010 Russia had already secured the Ukrainian
government’s consent to maintain the lease of its Sevastopol naval base
at least until 2042. However, the lease agreement signed by Kiev and
Moscow imposed important restrictions on the Russian Black Sea Fleet,

22      For a good analysis of how to counter Russia’s assymetrical threat to the Baltics see Jakub
Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, “Limited War is Back,” The National Interest, August 28, 2014.
23      Author’s interview with NATO defense official in Brussels, September 22, 2014.
24     Igor Delanoe, “After the Crimean crisis: towards a greater Russian maritime power in the
Black Sea,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 14, no. 3 (2014): 367-382.
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particularly when it came to deploying additional warships to Sevastopol
and replacing ageing platforms.25
Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia is now in a position
to earmark any additional warships and resources to Sevastopol, as
illustrated by the recent announcement by Admiral Viktor Chirkov
(commander-in-chief of the Russian navy) that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet
will be bolstered by the arrival of 30 new warships over the next six
years. In addition, the annexation of Crimea resulted in Russia’s acquisition of the majority of the platforms and assets of the Ukrainian navy.
More broadly, direct rule over Crimea represents a strengthening of
Russia’s geopolitical position in the northern rim of the Black Sea. A
consolidation of de facto Russian control over Eastern Ukraine (whatever
the political modalities) would only serve to further compound this fact.
What does this mean for the Alliance?
Any NATO/Western strategy aimed at balancing Russian naval
power in the Black Sea is complicated significantly by the legal regime
regulating the transit of warships through the Turkish straits. According
to the 1936 Montreux Convention, non-Black Sea nations must give
Turkey a 15-day notice before sending any warships through the straits
onto the Black Sea. Moreover, the access of non-Black Sea nations into
the Black Sea must be limited to 21 straight days per warship, and a
maximum aggregate tonnage of 45,000, with no vessel heavier than
15,000 tons.26
Admittedly, Turkey’s control of the Dardanelles Strait, the Sea of
Marmara and the Bosporus, and the fact NATO enjoys a position of
naval and strategic advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean mean Russia
is “bottled up” in the Black Sea anyway. However, if Russian power in
the Black Sea is left unchecked and that sea becomes a “Russian lake,”
small and medium Black Sea countries might begin “bandwagoning” on
Russia. Against such a backdrop, it would be far easier for Moscow to
use its proxies in Transinistria as a way of destabilizing Moldova, weaken
the Western link with Georgia and the Caucasus, as well as further
strengthen its position in Bulgaria – where it already enjoys considerable
economic and political influence. In other words, while Turkey might
continue to thwart Russia from breaking into the Eastern Mediterranean
and challenging the Alliance, Moscow could exploit its reinforced position in the Black Sea to consolidate and expand its influence over a
number of (weaker) NATO allies and partners in southeastern Europe.
How can the Alliance prevent such a scenario?
Turkey is certainly a key factor when it comes to the Black Sea – and
its NATO membership is of enormous geostrategic value to the West.
In this regard, the close political and military ties between Turkey and
Romania represent an important check to the prospect of Russian hegemony in the area.27 Greater Turkish-Romanian cooperation on naval and
missile defense matters would be particularly important in this regard.
Still, Ankara is wary of confronting Russia – a country on which it is
heavily dependent in terms of energy. Moreover, Turkey sees the recent
25      John C.K. Daly, “After Crimea: The Future of the Black Sea Fleet,” The Jamestown Foundation,
May 22, 2014.
26      Stephen Starr, “How The 1936 Montreux Convention Would Help Russia In A Ukraine
War,” International Business Times, May 12, 2014.
27      Author’s interview at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, May 30, 2014.
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wave of hostility between the West and Russia as an opportunity to
increase its own political leverage vis-à-vis both parties.28
The importance of the Turkish factor notwithstanding, NATO
should take additional measures to reinforce its position in and around
the Black Sea Basin. In late April 2014, the Alliance announced the
deployment of six combat aircraft to Romania, along with 200 troops,
pilots, mechanics and maintenance staff.29 Barely four months later,
Romania was designated “lead-nation” in an Alliance project to develop
Ukraine’s cyber defenses.30 These are steps in the right direction.
However, they should be further complemented with similar measures
aimed at streamlining the Alliance’s air and land posture in Bulgaria
(arguably the Alliance’s weakest link in southeastern Europe) and bolstering Sofia’s cyber-security capabilities.31 In addition to this, the Alliance
should make it a top priority to enhance the theater missile defenses of
Romania and Bulgaria and strengthen its military-to-military ties with
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
Insofar as the maritime domain is concerned, NATO should consider earmarking one of its Standing Maritime Groups to the Black Sea
to facilitate its engagement in permanent naval exercises and training
initiatives with the navies of Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia and Ukraine.
To mitigate the restrictions imposed by the legal regime of the Turkish
Straits prohibiting non-Black Sea warships to stay on that sea for longer
than 21 days, the Alliance might consider enhancing its presence at US
Naval Support Facility in Souda Bay (Crete). This move would help
reinforce the Alliance’s presence in the Aegean Sea and make it easier to
maintain a high tempo of naval rotations through the Turkish straits, as
well as react quickly to Black Sea-related contingencies.

Implications for European and Transatlantic Capabilities

Admittedly, defense and deterrence are not the main concern of all
European countries, many of whom continue to attach more importance to expeditionary operations and non-eastern flank contingencies.
Indeed, geopolitical volatility in the broader Middle East and the shift
of the world’s geostrategic center of gravity towards the Indo-Pacific
maritime axis underscore the ongoing importance of out-of-area concepts. However, the renewed focus on the eastern flank is likely to result
in a reinvigoration of NATO and lead many European allies to give
greater consideration to defense and deterrence in the context of their
own national force planning processes. It is only logical these changes
feed into European capability discussions within the Alliance, the EU,
as well as in a national context.32 This leads to a broader point: the crisis
of the crisis management paradigm.
28      Author’s interview at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, May 30, 2014.
29      “Allies Enhance NATO Air-policing Duties in Baltic States, Poland, Romania”: http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109354.htm
30      Author’s interview with NATO official in Brussels, September 22, 2014.
31      On the risks of Russian penetration in Bulgaria see Rachel A. Dicke, Ryan C. Hendrickson
and Steven Kut, “NATO’s Mafia Ally: The Strategic Consequences of Bulgarian Corruption,”
Comparative Strategy 33, No. 3 (2014): 287-298.
32      On the need to link NATO and EU force and capability generation processes see Alexander
Mattelaer, “Preparing NATO for the Next Defense-Planning Cycle,” RUSI Journal 159, No. 3 (JuneJuly 2014): 30-35.
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The crisis management paradigm has thrived on the assumotion
that Western military power can make free use of the “global commons”
(sea, air, space and cyber-space) to transit into out-of-area operational
theaters, thus allowing the West to engage in external crisis management and follow-up state-building initiatives. A related assumption was
the main challenges to the global commons would come in the form
of low-level transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized
crime (including cyber-crime) and so on. Similarly, obstacles to crisis
management and state-building endeavors would come not so much in
the form of traditional enemies, but through irregular and asymmetric
insurgencies.33
The crisis management paradigm has come to define the last two
decades, which have seen the Alliance engage in military conflicts with
relatively low-level adversaries and engage in follow-up state-building
enterprises through a combination of military, civilian, security sector
reform, political and economic initiatives. The emphasis on crisis
management and state-building has led Western countries to emphasize expeditionary military concepts and capabilities, but also to look
at ways to achieve greater coordination between military and civilian
operational tools. These parameters applied to the interventions in the
Western Balkans and Afghanistan, the main operational theaters for
post-Cold War NATO.
The crisis management paradigm was underpinned by Western
global strategic and political supremacy, and it has organized the way
in which Americans and Europeans have thought about military power
over the past twenty-five years. Crisis management has had a pervasive
influence upon Alliance doctrine and capability debates since the end of
the Cold War. It has also been central to European military transformation, having come to organize the strategic culture, operational doctrine
and approach to capability development for most European countries
over the past two decades.34
Today, the crisis management paradigm itself is in crisis – and
NATO’s increasing focus on defense and deterrence in Eastern Europe
is just one manifestation of a deeper strategic trend. Reasons behind
the “crisis of crisis management” are manifold, and include the return
of great power competition (both in Europe and globally), intervention
fatigue in the West, as well as declining defense budgets in the United
States and Europe. Another key factor in this regard is the development
and proliferation of so-called “anti-access area denial” capabilities, aimed
at denying Western military forces access and freedom of movement in
a given theater of operations. Such capabilities are being developed primarily by China and Russia, but are also being exported to countries like
Iran and Syria.35 The anti-access area denial challenge includes kinetic
(i.e. ballistic and cruise missiles) as well as non-kinetic capabilities (i.e.
cyber and anti-space weapons).
33     Antulio J Echevarria II, “After Afghanistan: Lessons for NATO’s Future Wars,” RUSI Journal
159, No. 3 (June-July 2014): 20-23.
34      Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga, and Theo Farrell (eds.), A Transformation Gap? American Innovations
and European Military Change (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
35      For a good overview of the A2/AD challenge see John Gordon IV and John Matsumura,
“The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenges,” RAND Corporation,
Report for the US Army (2013).
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Mounting defense budgetary pressures and an increasingly contested global political and strategic environment are underpinning a
rebalance within Western military strategy, from intervention towards
defense, deterrence, intelligence, prevention and military diplomacy.
Against such a backdrop, the West may need to move away from the
assumption of unhindered global access and freedom of movement and
think more about how to preserve Western supremacy in the commons
(sea, air, space and cyber-space) and how to use the commons to project
power in a contested environment. While this does not mean the era
of Western expeditionary military interventions is over, long-lasting
military engagements will tend to be avoided and “surgical” forms of
intervention prioritized, i.e. precision strikes, special operation forces,
cyber-attacks, etc.
The United States has already begun to grapple with the implications
of the crisis of the crisis management paradigm. Indeed, the Pentagon’s
growing emphasis on building partnership capacity reflects a prioritization of defense diplomacy and prevention over intervention.36 In turn,
concepts like airsea battle, conventional prompt global strike, missile
and space defense or directed-energy weapons can help overcome the
anti-access area denial challenge as well as strengthen deterrence and
defense.37
European debates on capability development must also transcend external crisis management and adopt a multi-task mindframe.
To strengthen defense and deterrence in an eastern flank context,
Europeans should pay greater attention to air-land capabilities (i.e. air
combat, air defense, heavy armor and artillery, etc.), cyber-defense, strategic and theater missile defense or energy-based weaponry. Insofar as
power projection is concerned, fewer resources should be devoted to
strategic airlift and sealift, air-to-air refueling or tactical airlift. These
capabilities are broadly aimed at enabling expeditionary operations in
permissive strategic environments, and are likely to become less relevant as the external crisis management paradigm wears down. In this
regard, greater emphasis should be placed on capabilities and concepts
that can both contribute to assert (Western) strategic supremacy in the
global commons and help project military power in more challenging
operational environments, such as long-range strike, air and sea combat,
undersea warfare, stealthy aerial combat systems, cyber warfare, space
defense and anti-satellite weapons, etc.

Conclusions

Throughout 2014, NATO has adopted a number of measures aimed
at consolidating its position in Europe’s eastern flank in the context
of an increasingly assertive Russia. Such measures have included the
creation of a 4,000-6,000 strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force,
the streamlining of the Alliance’s command, control and logistical

36      Deni (ed.), op. cit., note 10.
37     Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2010); Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and LongRange Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,”Congressional Research Service, 26 August 2014; Mark
Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy Weapons
(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012); Tod Harrison, The Future
of MilSatCom (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013).
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infrastructure, and a series of rotational force deployments into Central
and Eastern Europe. These measures constitute important steps.
However, if they are to create a lasting impact upon European security,
they should be complemented by a more permanent and sizable allied
military presence in Central and Eastern Europe and a broader effort
to regenerate the conventional military power of the European allies.
The former will require structural changes in both force planning and
capability development.
Admittedly, a return of a Cold War-type confrontation with Russia
over Eastern Europe could weaken the West’s standing elsewhere especially at a time when the fulcrum of global geopolitics is rapidly shifting
towards the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East is beset by mounting
instability. Not least, an escalation of tensions between the West and
Russia could push the latter towards China and seriously undermine
the security of the Western-based global order. However, this is precisely why the transatlantic allies should focus on hardening defense
and deterrence in Europe’s eastern flank. For one thing, Russia might
interpret any Western attempts to reach an accommodation as a sign of
weakness, and an invitation to further expansion. This interpretation
could eventually require a greater commitment of Western strategic and
financial resources to Eastern European security in the medium and
long term. Moreover, if the West is ever to establish any sort of meaningful dialogue with Russia on global security issues, it must do so from a
position of strength. Thus, hardening the defenses of Eastern Europe
must be a pre-condition to any such dialogue.

